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Abstract 
 
While advanced defenders have successfully used 
honeyfiles to detect unauthorized intruders and insider 
threats for more than 30 years, the complexity 
associated with adaptively devising enticing content 
has limited their diffusion. This paper presents four 
new designs for automating the construction of 
honeyfile content. The new designs select a document 
from the target directory as a template and employ 
word transposition and substitution based on parts of 
speech tagging and n-grams collected from both the 
target directory and the surrounding file system. These 
designs were compared to previous methods using a 
new theory to quantitatively evaluate honeyfile 
enticement. The new designs were able to successfully 
mimic the content from the target directory, whilst 
minimizing the introduction of material from other 
sources. The designs may also hold potential to match 
many of the characteristics of nearby documents, 
whilst minimizing the replication of copyrighted or 
classified material from documents they are protecting. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
1.1. Honeyfiles  
 
Honeyfiles [35], also referred to as honeytokens 
[26], digital decoys [15], decoy files [9], and canary 
files [31], is a cyber deception approach that has the 
potential to assist in the detection of data exfiltration 
and unauthorised access. Honeyfiles perform this role 
by emulating ‘real’ documents in order to lure and bait 
data thieves. 
Honeyfiles have several advantages over honeypots 
and traditional security approaches. When correctly 
positioned and configured, honeyfiles have been 
proven to generate a negligible quantity of important 
alerts [6]. Ordinarily, honeyfiles should not be 
accessed, as their fake content provides zero benefit for 
legitimate users. Any user or process attempting to 
open, copy or delete a honeyfile provides a warning, 
analogous to a canary in a coalmine. By concentrating 
on the alerts generated by honeyfiles, intrusion 
detection teams can reduce the volume of documents 
requiring constant observation.   
Honeyfiles, like other forms of deception, can 
create uncertainty regarding the disposition of critical 
information [27] and increase the effort required to 
distinguish between real and fake data [30]. The data 
thief does not know where the traps are placed and 
risks detection each time they open a document [35].  
Unlike honeypots, honeyfiles do not need dedicated 
hardware, nor expose additional software 
vulnerabilities to exploitation [31]. Honeyfiles can also 
be placed directly within document repositories, 
amongst the files that require protection, rather than 
isolated on different network hosts, collision domains, 
and/or network segments [28]. 
 
 
Figure 1. Low and High Interaction Honeyfiles 
1.2. High-interaction Honeyfiles 
 
Honeypot technologies have been previously 
classified as either low-interaction or high-interaction 
[19]. Low-interaction honeypots trade the depth of 
mimicry for lower risk of sensor compromise, 
implementation cost and management overhead [36]. 
High-interaction honeypots employ greater realism, 
which provides more potential to sustain a deception, 
allowing the system owner to gather additional 
intelligence on the source and intentions of the 
intruder/insider [19]. This comes at a greater cost of 
design and management overhead. 
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This paper proposes that honeyfiles can be 
similarly categorized (see Figure 1). Low-interaction 
honeyfiles simulate only the existence of a file. They 
may mimic basic file features, such as size and time 
stamps, but lack the complexity to sustain the illusion. 
Low-interaction honeyfiles are unlikely to contain 
words, sentences, video or any meaningful 
information. These low-interaction options may be 
useful to create initial confusion and detection of 
simple document harvesting programs. 
High-interaction honeyfiles replicate the local 
environment with greater accuracy. One key advantage 
is that their content can entice external threat actors 
(who typically scan newly accessed file systems to 
identify valuable documents) [30][29]. High-
interaction honeyfiles are also effective against 
malicious insiders masquerading as legitimate users; 
the attacker’s lack of knowledge of the victim’s access 
profile (files, locations of important directories, 
available applications, etc.) means that they are likely 
to engage in information gathering and search activities 
before initiating specific actions [6]. Both these threat 
actors could employ direct searches of the content or 
employ extant knowledge management systems that 
centralize or index the critical data [14] (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Threat actors target file system content  
Like their honeypot namesakes, high-interaction 
honeyfiles are more suited to assist in determining the 
patterns and behaviors, objectives, tactics, techniques 
and procedures of the data thieves. Honeyfiles can be 
built with a range of properties, including the choice of 
content, format, complexity, quantity and location [30]. 
For instance, consider if honeyfiles that contain text 
associated with nuclear fusion are accessed, but those 
containing information relating to location of nuclear 
facilities are not. This intelligence may be valuable in 
understanding the data thief’s intended target(s) and/or 
priorities, especially when fused with other traditional 
information sources. Employment of more complex 
content can also allow a system owner to detect subtle 
and partial data exfiltration. For instance, signatures 
can be generated using individual honeyfile paragraphs 
to detect partial or slow theft of document data hidden 
amongst other seemingly benign email or web traffic. 
Similar to honeypots, high and low interaction 
honeyfiles could also work in unison as a compromise 
among sensor coverage, detection and management 
cost. For instance, low-interaction honeyfiles could be 
deployed across the file system or operating system 
environments to detect automated intrusions. These 
could be paired with high-interaction honeyfiles in 
locations containing high value sets of documents, 
where the ‘why’ and ‘how’ are more important (and 
more cost effective). 
 
2. Generating High-Interaction Honeyfiles 
 
2.1. Honeyfile Diffusion 
 
While high-interaction honeyfiles have been 
employed in computer security for more than 30 years 
their success in the hands of advanced defenders has 
not translated into mainstream use. Comparatively, the 
concepts of usage control, encryption and content 
tagging (watermarking), have evolved to commercial 
products. The lack of diffusion appears related to the 
difficulty of constructing deceptive content across the 
spectrum of potential data formats [33]. Rowe [24], a 
prolific author on cyber deception, stated that honeyfile 
content could never be automated. His position appears 
justified. When building fake data for 11 fixed 
database fields White and Thompson [30] noted, “It 
takes a lot of effort to produce realistic decoys... It took 
several months of research to locate all of the data that 
was needed to produce each field. This information 
also had to be processed into a usable form in order to 
incorporate it into the program. This is a very labor 
intensive task”. Even a recent solution proposed by 
Wang et al [29] requires a new software module to be 
developed for each topic. This approach is not scalable 
[25] and is at odds with the ‘ease of use’ security 
product design principle [2]. 
 
2.2. Attempts to Generate Honeyfile Content 
 
Most of the previous work on honeyfiles has 
focused on the placement and monitoring of baits, and 
has rarely paid attention to content or automatic 
creation of files [13]. Discussions on fake content have 
been centered on specific data types and formats, such 
as database fields [30][17], passwords and account 
details [8][21][16] and file attributes [24][35] 
[9][6][28][29]. 
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There have been several attempts to automate the 
generation of fake content. This paper groups these 
current designs into four categories: Type I - IV. 
Type I constructs produce low-interaction 
honeyfiles and simple deceptions that populate fake 
files with random data. Rowe [24] built a prototype 
fake file generator (NFDir) that is capable of 
populating documents with random characters. A 
similar approach has been adopted in free online 
resources. Fake File Generator and File Destructor 2.0 
are tools to generate corrupted files so that students can 
gain more time to complete their assignments. Both 
software solutions create non-working files using 
random binary data and adopting common extensions.  
Type II high-interaction honeyfile processes 
populate documents with content from an external 
source. NFDir is also able to generate files comprising 
of images, captions, and page names extracted from 
publicly accessible military web pages. Bowen et al [9] 
also considered using words that were frequently 
searched on the Internet as the constituent words in 
fake documents. The Impressions software program 
[1], while not used to make honeyfiles, creates content 
using word popularity models of the English language.  
Type III approaches attempt to reduce the content 
generation problem for high-interaction honeyfiles to a 
manageable size by employing templates and fixed 
data fields. In 2005, Stribling and his colleagues 
developed an automatic computer-science paper 
generator, called SCIGen [3]. SCIGen constructed 
entire academic publications, including text, graphs, 
figures, and citations. The program relies on hand-
written rules and a set template. Infamously, the 
authors used the software to generate a confusing and 
partially illegible paper, which was successfully 
accepted by the World Multi-conference on Systemics, 
Cybernetics and Informatics, albeit without peer 
review. White and Thompson [30] built fake content 
for an 11-field database containing personal records. 
Three years later, Bowen et al [9] produced the Decoy 
Document Distributor (D3) System, a tool for 
automatically generating and monitoring fake 
documents. The initial D3 prototype was limited to 
Microsoft Word and PDF documents from a set of 
fixed templates, including tax returns, medical records, 
credit card statements, and e-Bay receipts. 
Type IV honeyfile methods comprise those designs 
that (1) use existing production files as bait, or (2) 
reproduce part or all of an existing document using 
another format, language or synonyms. Yuill et al [35] 
designed a system to allow a user to nominate a 
production file to become a honeyfile. Similarly, 
‘Honeydocs’ is a free deception solution. Users 
provide Honeydocs with a file, and the program 
embeds a beacon to track its location on the Internet. 
Park and Stolfo [22] built a system to generate fake 
Java programs. Their design obfuscates the original 
source code, creating compilable but syntactically 
dissimilar software. Shortly after, Voris et al [28] 
proposed a method of translating existing documents 
into a language foreign to the file system. They 
sequentially processed selected paragraphs through 
five different language translations. 
 
2.3. Limitations of Current Solutions 
 
Random data produced by Type I honeyfiles are 
likely to be unrealistic, foreign to the file system and 
directory, and appear suspicious. These types of 
processes do not typically generate sentences, words or 
other standard content that would be expected to reside 
within a document or match keywords searched by 
data thieves. These files merely present the illusion that 
the file contains, or once contained useful data. The 
only key advantages of these types of files are that they 
are simple to produce, and they will not contain 
classified, sensitive or copyright material.  
Type II honeyfile content is likely to be more 
realistic and enticing than Type I, because it contains 
indexable words. Type II files, however, are unlikely to 
match the topics, word frequency and author 
stylometry. They may not necessarily contain 
sentences or paragraphs, or similar embedded artifacts. 
There is no doubt that templates can be developed 
that will produce realistic and enticing text. The main 
challenge with Type III approaches is that templates 
and hand-written rules are neither scalable nor 
adaptable to the range of content that is likely to be 
encountered in a real world application. 
While current approaches still largely rely on hand 
written rules, Type IV methods of construction hold 
potential to produce realistic and enticing decoys that 
match the local content that they are attempting to 
protect. The primary challenge with employing a 
production document as a honeyfile is that this process 
is likely to risk classified, sensitive or copyrighted 
material. Type IV processes typically retain the core 
meaning of the original text or functionality of the 
software. This limitation is consistent throughout the 
entire set of Type IV honeyfiles. For example, 
although content containment was tested to limit the 
retention of original code artifacts, Park and Stolfo’s 
[22] process appeared to generate a functioning replica 
of the original software. It is unclear, therefore, if this 
modified code is just as valuable as the original 
intellectual property and should not be risked with 
deception activities. Similarly, the solution proposed 
by Voris et al [28] simply transforms sensitive material 
into another language. It is still likely to retain 
sensitive artifacts from the source documents thereby 
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creating a protection paradox. Finally, any approach 
that uses production documents that are no longer, 
relevant, critical or sensitive, by definition, will be less 
enticing to a data thief, and therefore unsatisfactory 
honeyfile candidates. 
 
2.4. Type V - NLP-based Designs 
 
Section 4 of this paper presents four new designs 
based on Natural Language Processing (NLP). NLP is 
a field of computer science, artificial intelligence, and 
linguistics concerned with automating the 
understanding and creation of human readable text. 
NLP may help to widen the approachability and 
convenience of honeyfiles. Like other fields, 
automation could (1) reduce the labor cost associated 
with the process, (2) improve their reliability and 
consistency, (3) speed up the generation process, and 
(4) allow the process to happen more frequently [23]. 
The main advantage of automation, however, would 
appear to lie in its ability to address complexity 
barriers, by allowing the honeyfile generation process 
to be undertaken by staff with less skill [23]. 
Automated solutions may also adjust and adapt to new 
content and scale to large and complex environments. 
 
3. Assessment of NLP-based Designs  
 
3.1. Scenario 
 
The scenario developed for this research is that the 
system owner seeks to place a honeyfile within a 
directory in their digital file system. The role of the 
honeyfile is to act as an early warning for the theft of 
any or all of the files residing within the file repository, 
but in particular, those files within that file directory. 
There are a number of assumptions and limitations 
associated with the scenario. The honeyfiles are 
protecting directories within a file system, rather than 
databases and other information management systems. 
While other information storage systems are becoming 
increasingly popular for big data, file systems remain a 
fundamental mechanism for storing digital information 
[20]. This research only considered English text 
content. Diagrams, figures and images were not 
included. Despite the number of multimedia documents 
rising, most of the interesting information in digital 
format is still numeric or textual [17]. The study 
assumes that all files contained within the directory are 
equally sensitive. It could be possible to encounter 
folders that contain a mixture of document 
sensitivities. In practice, however, most human users 
organize folders by common topics and authors [4]. 
This grouping provides a theme for each honeyfile to 
defend and mimic. 
 
3.2. Test Data 
 
Two test data sets were used. The first data set 
contained 1000 test directories populated with 
academic papers (in PDF format) harvested from the 
Internet, using a similar manner to [11]. The majority 
of papers were downloaded from SIGCOMM 
Conference web sites. The remaining papers were 
harvested using Google Scholar. All papers were 
manually inspected to confirm the contents were not 
scanned images or fake files. All of the harvested PDF 
documents were reduced to text files using the open 
source Apache Tika software [17]. Each directory was 
populated with a uniform distribution of between 2 and 
13 documents, chosen at random, based on the 
observations of previous file system surveys [32] 
This synthetic data set was deliberately chosen to 
align with an existing honeyfile template. This 
eliminated the requirement to create a new Type III 
honeyfile template to match the dataset. 
The second dataset used a copy of a small 
business’s production file system. The real-world data 
set evaluated the honeyfile design’s ability to navigate 
duplications, data errors and expose the designs to 
realistic human organizational patterns. 1000 
directories were selected at random. The files were also 
converted to text using Apache Tika. 
 
3.3. Current Honeyfile Design Representatives  
 
An exemplar design was chosen to represent each 
of the current honeyfile content generation approaches 
(Type I-IV). The chosen Type I exemplar process 
creates honeyfile content using a subset of ASCII 
characters, selected at random. The sub-set included all 
members of the upper and lower case English alphabet, 
numbers and the blank space character. Each of the 
characters in the sub-set was given an equal chance of 
selection.  
The Type II exemplar process selected words at 
random from the Brown Corpus (a popular dataset 
used by the NLP community) [10], based on the 
underlying word frequency distribution. 
Type III constructions were represented by the 
SCIGen [3] fake academic paper generation tool 
(previously discussed). The SCIGen PDF documents 
were converted to text using Apache Tika, matching 
the process used to create the test data sets.  
A method similar to Voris, et al [28] was chosen to 
represent Type IV honeyfiles. In this example process, 
a file is chosen at random from the target directory and 
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then translated from English to Spanish, to French and 
then back to English. The selection of languages was 
made to support an offline conversion process. 
 
3.4 Comparing Honeyfiles and Defining 
‘Enticing’ Assessment Criteria 
 
This paper compared the enticement produced by 
the individual honeyfile designs. Whitham [32] 
identified seven criteria for honeyfile content 
generation. Of these, the most essential requirement of 
a honeyfile content generation process is to spawn 
enticing material [6]. Bowen et al [9] associated a fake 
file’s ability to entice with the desirability of the data 
thief to access and/or exfiltrate its contents. For 
instance, a fake file that suggested or contained a list of 
passwords might be more desirable than a document 
containing the monthly office social calendar.  
There is currently no existing theory on defining or 
evaluating the enticement of a honeyfile. This paper 
presents an initial theory and evaluation method that 
matches the chosen scenario.  
One of the principal aims of high-interaction 
honeyfiles is to present themselves as genuine targets 
to indexing technologies, baiting external threat actors 
and insiders who are searching for valuable 
information within the file system (see Figure 2). The 
ability of the honeyfile to entice these threat actors can 
be improved with selective attribute choices [6]. 
Creating honeyfiles that mimic this content 
achieves two primary goals. First and foremost, like 
angling, it is important for the lure to match the typical 
diet of the fish. Honeyfiles can only detect data theft if 
the fake file is accessed [12]. The more enticing the 
deceptive content, the more likely that an intruder will 
access the fake file and trigger the alarm. The scenario 
assumes that the content in the test directories is 
sufficiently valuable to warrant protection. Matching 
the material found within the local directory populates 
the honeyfile with (equally) desirable content.  
Moreover, one of the advantages of cyber deception 
is the ability for the system owner to obtain 
information about the data thief, their motivations and 
targets. For instance, the system owner might gain a 
valuable insight into the goals of the perpetrator if a set 
of honeyfiles containing engineering and research 
content was accessed, but honeyfiles mimicking 
financial records were not. This knowledge is only 
possible if the honeyfile content is deliberately tailored 
to carry a subset of the critical data. The file 
directories, by their nature, are likely to be associated 
with a single topic, and provide a logical source of 
content for an individual honeyfile.  
The second reason for matching the content of the 
honeyfile with the legitimate files in the directory is 
associated with minimizing false positives. One of the 
limitations of honeyfiles is their potential to disrupt 
normal work activity and pollute genuine information. 
By limiting the content of the honeyfile to strictly those 
topics discussed in the target directory, the system 
owner can minimize the impact on legitimate workers. 
Consider a honeyfile that contained random content. 
To a corporate information management system, 
random content is likely to match a range of topics 
across the file system, and not just those topics 
discussed in the sensitive directory folders. These 
honeyfiles containing random content are more likely 
to be recommended when legitimate users employ 
content searching / indexing technologies to locate 
unrelated, less sensitive information in the file system. 
This will increase the number of unintended 
interactions with the honeyfile, creating additional 
work for the incident responders, and lowering their 
confidence in the deception system.  
These two content enticement goals can be 
summarized as:  
1. Maximize the number of matches with topics 
discussed in the files in the local directory.  
2. Minimize the number of matches with topics that 
are not discussed in the local directory.  
In its simplest form, the above two enticement 
goals can be described using standard set theory. 
Consider the given scenario where a high-interaction 
honeyfile is created to assist in the detection of 
suspicious activity relating to a directory of critical 
documents housed within a file system. Assuming that 
the critical file is text based, the unique topics (T) in 
the target directory can be represented as D = {T1, ... 
,Tm}. Given a honeyfile content generation function, 
ƒ(X), the unique topics (θ) contained in a honeyfile can 
be  represented as H = {θ1, ... ,θj}. Assuming that all of 
the topics discussed within the document are of equal 
sensitivity, the ultimate aim of developing enticing 
content, therefore, is for ƒ(X) to build a honeyfile that 
contains every topic in D, or H ⊆ D.  
Partial enticement success can therefore be 
achieved if the honeyfile contains at least one of the 
topics discussed in the critical file (where H∩D is 
inhabited), that is: ∃	H  D : ƒ(X) - the lower the set 
difference between D and H (D\H), the better. These 
goals are illustrated in Figure 3. 
Assuming there is no ability to compress topics, the 
process of including all of the topics contained in the 
directory could, at worst, make the file size of the 
honeyfile equal to the sum of the file lengths of the 
legitimate documents in the directory:  
It would appear that the most effective method of 
meeting this goal would be to build large honeyfiles 
that contain a replication of all of the topics in D. This 
action, however, is at odds with the requirement for 
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building realistic honeyfiles (the honeyfile is expected 
to have a similar file size to the legitimate files in the 
directory). That is, the honeyfile may only contain 1/n 
of the topics found in the directory.  
 
 
Figure 3. Maximize directory topic matches 
Assuming that the legitimate files contain a similar 
number of topics, then it follows that the greater the 
number of files in the directory, the more difficult it 
would be to achieve this enticement goal (without 
sacrificing realism or compressing the topics).  
The worst-case scenario is unlikely. Firstly, the 
above assumes that there is topic repetition within a 
document or within files in the target directory, which 
is unlikely. Secondly, one of the scenario assumptions 
is that files have been organized into a directory based 
on topic and/or author. It is possible, therefore, that 
there is a natural duplication and overlap of topics 
between files in the same directory. Thirdly, this also 
assumes that topic conversations are of equal length, 
which is unlikely to be the case in natural language 
[34]. Finally, the above assumes that all content in the 
files is relevant and required to communicate the topic 
and there is no redundant content, either through 
structure, partly completed work or through 
tautologies, verbosity and other discursive behavior.  
 
 
Figure 4. Minimize file system topic matches 
While optimization may address these challenges, 
there remains the strong possibility that not all topics 
contained within the directory can be represented by a 
single honeyfile, particularly in directories with a large 
number of documents. Prioritizing the selection of 
topics is therefore critical to the content generation of 
high-interaction honeyfiles. The ability of the honeyfile 
generation process to successfully recognize and 
prioritize these topics forms the basis of the first 
enticing assessment criteria.  
For the second enticement goal, the set of topics 
that are included in the honeyfile, but are not discussed 
in the critical file can be identified by the set difference 
between H and D. The closer H\D tends to the empty 
set (∅), the better. This includes the topics discussed in 
H that are also present in elsewhere in the file system, 
and those topics in H that are introduced from external 
sources. This concept is illustrated in Figure 4, where 
the smaller the percentage of blue area, the better, 
regardless of the intersections with the yellow set (file 
system).  
 
4. New NLP-based Designs 
 
This paper presents four new NLP-based designs. 
These designs are based on the substitution and 
transposition of words collected from the target 
directory and file system. Each of the designs 
employed the same three stages: (1) template selection, 
(2) content extraction, and (3) document population 
(see Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5. The new designs employ a 3 stage process 
In the first step, the median sized file is selected 
from the target directory to use as a template for the 
honeyfile. In the second step, the words are stripped 
from the template and replaced with parts of speech 
XML-like tags (see Figure 6). The original 
punctuation, numbers and symbols are retained to 
ensure that the sentence lengths and structure of the 
document are mimicked.  
 
Figure 6. Text is replaced by POS mark-ups 
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Finally, the reduced template is used as a guide to 
build the honeyfile. Once the honeyfile is constructed, 
the signatures relating to the file and its content are 
forwarded to the extant intrusion detection systems for 
monitoring, and the honeyfile is deployed into the 
target directory.  
One of the more complex steps involves converting 
the selected document into Parts Of Speech (POS) 
XML-like tags. The designs employ the popular 
Natural Language Tool Kit (NLTK) to classify the 
words into 35 POS tags. Figure 7 provides an example 
of a section of words prior to and after the conversion. 
Note that the case of the original word is retained in the 
POS marking. 
 
 
Figure 7. Text from the template is replaced with 
POS mark up language, retaining the case 
4.1. Type Va 
 
In Design Va all of the words from the target 
directory are sorted into POS ‘word buckets’. The 
frequency of the words is retained. Design Va replaces 
each of the POS tags in the honeyfile template with a 
random word drawn from one of the ‘word buckets’ 
collected from the target directory. Once a word is 
selected from a ‘word bucket’ it is no longer available 
for future selection.  
 
4.2. Type Vb 
 
Design Vb is an extension of Design 1 except that 
the honeyfile population process employs conditional 
frequency to select a word from a ‘word bucket’. 
Conditional frequency is a form of Markov process 
that takes advantage of the fact that sentence 
construction is not random. The process assumes that 
the future behaviour of the system only depends on its 
recent history [5]. Conditional frequency has 
previously been applied to predictive text and spelling 
corrections [18], where models guess the next word 
based on the relative frequency and combination of 
previous words. In these cases, the conditional 
frequency model employs n-grams of prior context to 
make the selection on the next word. In order to build 
the cumulative frequency models, the target directory 
text was organised into 2, 3 4 and 5 word n-grams. A 
‘word bucket’ was created for each n-gram collection.  
During the honeyfile population step, Design Vb 
attempts to select a word that matches an n-gram from 
one of its ‘word buckets’ and the honeyfile template’s 
POS tag. Design Vb starts this process by attempting to 
identify word options that could match known 
quingrams. If no matching quingrams can be identified, 
the process tries quadgrams. This continues until either 
a bigram match is found or a word is chosen at random 
from that particular POS ‘word bucket’.  
 
4.3. Type Vc 
 
Design Vc is an extension of Design Vb. In 
addition to the POS tagging and cumulative frequency 
model selection process, design Vc also collects 
bigrams from across the entire file system as a final 
option when a Markov Chain cannot recommend an 
option from the target directory text alone.  
 
4.4. Type Vd 
 
Design Vd is an extension of Vc, but it captures all 
of the 2, 3, 4 and 5 word n-grams across the target file 
system and uses a logarithmic scaled Term Frequency - 
Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) to prioritize 
the n-grams captured from the directory over those in 
the corpus. TF-IDF is a popular product of two 
statistical algorithms that have been commonly applied 
in tandem to weight the value of documents in 
information search processes.  
A random weighting is applied to each option at the 
time of word selection in order to ensure that: (1) the 
most common term, for instance “in to the”, is not 
continually selected; and (2) that a new honeyfile is 
created each time the process runs. The weighting 
value was randomly selected from values between the 
lowest score and the highest score.  
 
5. Results  
 
5.1. Maximizing Matches - Directory Content 
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Figure 8 presents the raw distribution of results 
from processing the data set of 1000 directories 
containing academic-paper extracts. Each value 
represents the percentage of words (topics) that 
appeared in both the honeyfile and the target directory.  
The higher the score the better. 
 
 
Figure 8. Probability Distribution of Maximizing 
Content from Target Directory 
By observation, designs Vb, Vc and Vd out 
performed all of the previous approaches, while Va 
scored similar results to the highest performing current 
approach. As expected, the random data from Type I 
constructions bear virtually no similarity to the file 
content in the directories that they are attempting to 
mimic. Type II and III have a small level of similarity, 
as expected through sharing the natural properties of 
English language. Type IV does not perform as well as 
expected. This is most likely due to the fact that the 
process mimics one file well, but not an entire file 
directory.  
 
 
Figure 9. Maximizing Content - Target Directory 
Figure 9 presents the mean scores from each of the 
academic and small business data sets. Contrast is 
limited, except for Type IV. Additional investigation is 
required, but it is likely that these constructions were 
affected by a combination of the diversity of files 
contained in the real-world file directories (e.g. partly 
finished documents and different content types), and 
the potential for random choice to make relatively poor 
selections of files within these directories to use as a 
representative honeyfile template.  
A one-sided p-value test was conducted on the four 
proposed designs against the current designs with a 
significance of 5% to test the hypothesis that the new 
Type V designs were a measurable improvement on 
the current approaches. The Va comparison against 
Type II constructions (using the academic data set) was 
the only assessment that scored greater than 0.000%. 
 
 
Figure 10. Probability Distribution of Minimizing 
Content from Target File System 
5.2. Minimizing Matches – File System Content 
 
Figure 10 presents the raw distribution of results 
from processing the data set of 1000 directories 
containing academic-paper extracts. Each value 
represents the percentage of words (topics) that 
appeared in both the honeyfile and the entire target file 
system but not the target directory. The lower the score 
the better. 
 
 
Figure 11. Minimizing Content - Target File System 
Va, Vb, and Vd all produced near perfect scores, 
out-performing all of the previous approaches. Vd 
scored similar results to the highest performing current 
approach (Type IV). Type I could not be properly 
assessed as the text only produced ‘words’ by chance. 
Type II and III contain large traces of content that does 
not appear in the target directory, but appears across 
the file system. The translation processes involved in 
Type IV constructs also seem to introduce a small 
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number of words that do not appear in the target 
directory, but appear elsewhere in the file system. 
Figure 11 presents the mean scores from each of 
the academic and small business data sets. Once again, 
the different data sets do not provide much contrast. 
A one-sided p-value test was conducted on the four 
designs against the current designs with a significance 
of 5% to test the hypothesis that the new Type V 
designs were an improvement on the current 
approaches. The Vd comparison against Type IV (both 
data sets) was the only assessment that failed the 
hypothesis evaluation.  
 
6. Conclusions  
 
Advanced defenders have successfully used 
honeyfiles to detect unauthorized intruders and insider 
threats for more than 30 years. Unfortunately, the 
complexity of the content generation process has 
prevented their wider diffusion.  
This paper presents an NLP-based content 
generation design for honeyfiles that select a document 
from a target directory and employ transposition and 
substitution of text using parts of speech tagging and n-
grams harvested from the target directory and 
surrounding file system. 
The level of enticement of these new designs was 
compared to previous methods of high and low 
interaction honeyfile generation. Two sets of 1000 test 
directories containing text content were used to 
evaluate the honeyfiles. A honeyfile from each design 
was built to simulate the process of creating bait files 
for each of the directories.  
There is no previous published work on the 
quantitative evaluation of honeyfile enticement. This 
paper introduced a new approach, based on set theory, 
using topic (word) comparisons. This study also found 
that NLP-based designs could produce English text 
content for honeyfiles that match file directories. This 
process appears independent to the target content. 
While the four new designs may not produce 
completely legible text, there is potential for the 
constructions to contain sufficient traces of enticing 
material to deceive an automated search process or 
malicious insider into accessing the document and 
triggering an alarm. These designs may also match 
many of the characteristics of the nearby documents, 
including the sentence and paragraph lengths and 
complexities, as well as the underlying format. The use 
of randomisation in text selection may also minimise 
the replication of classified, sensitive or copyrighted 
material and reduce the chance that the honeyfile 
creates a protection paradox by duplicating sections of 
sensitive sections of text from the file system (that also 
need protection).  
 
7. Future Research  
 
Further research is underway to improve the 
realism of these new honeyfile designs, while 
minimising the retention of sensitive content. Future 
research could also consider alternative options for 
building honeyfiles and testing their enticement. 
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